Mission in “the Present Time”: What about the People in Diaspora?

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The present time is changing, and the world we thought we knew growing up no longer exists. How we see and understand the world is also changing. Our way of “figuring out the world” that we leaned on when we first started mission work now almost certainly explains less and less of what we see. As the world changes, so does our understanding. And so we face a challenge: either deal with these changes—which are neither good nor bad in themselves—or risk becoming increasingly out of touch with the world God has called us to love. But just how are we to perceive our changing world? How are we to understand rapidly changing persons, peoples, politics, and economics in light of our participation in God’s mission in the world?

Thomas and Susan: A Case Study in Diaspora Life

In 1977, Thomas finished his secondary education and a short diploma course in his home state of Kerala, India. While searching for work, his eye fell on a recruiting ad in a local newspaper for jobs in the construction industry in Saudi Arabia. Although workers had been migrating to the Gulf States for years, Thomas was among the first cohort of foreign workers to migrate because of the oil boom. People with college degrees usually were offered office jobs, but he was given a construction job pushing a wheelbarrow. One day he showed his British foreman his diploma and convinced him that he had the skills for a desk job. Soon he was offered a contract for a job in an office.

About the same time, Susan, a practicing nurse, was recruited from Delhi to take employment in Saudi Arabia. After a few years in Saudi, she moved again to take a better paying job in Kuwait.

The migrant workers in our story were both committed to observing Indian custom regarding the proper way to find a spouse. Although they did not know each other, while each was vacationing back in Kerala, a marriage proposal...
was made through their local pastors. They met briefly, married, then returned to the Middle East. Thomas left his job in Saudi and obtained a visitor's visa to join Susan in Kuwait, eventually finding work with a shipping company. They began to build a life together.

Although they had migrated to the Gulf for jobs, their salaries were not their own. Like many migrants, Thomas and Susan shared what they earned, sending regular money transfers (remittances) back home to help care for younger siblings and elderly parents. They even sublet half the living room in their small apartment in the city just to pay the rent each month.

In 1981, a girl was born to Thomas and Susan. Once she was old enough, Priya went to school in Kuwait, that is, to an Indian school in Kuwait. Except for her three years in India (as a result of the 1990-91 Iraqi invasion) and her time in university, Priya never spent much time outside Kuwait growing up. Even after graduation, she did not stay in India, but returned to Kuwait to work. Priya is now married and lives in Sydney, Australia where she works as an engineer for an international energy corporation.

In 1984, a second daughter, Anita, was born, who followed a similar path. Returning to India for secondary school was not easy for her. Her only friends had also returned from expat communities elsewhere and thus understood her experience. After university, she too returned to Kuwait since her parents were still there. But when a better-paying job opened up in the United Arab Emirates, a larger Middle Eastern country with a less restrictive vision for society, Anita jumped at the chance to move to the UAE, where she now lives and works.

The third and last child, a boy, was born in 1985. Santhosh remembers life revolving around school and church (which had both weekly and daily services). Now a student in the United States, Santhosh is supported in part by his parents and sisters. He knows that this confirms his responsibility as the youngest male child to care for his parents in their old age. For now, his parents are still finishing out their contracts in Kuwait, so that day has not yet come.3

This story, simple though it may seem, illustrates issues that any student of society—or any missionary wanting to reach people—must face. So, what does it take to understand this family’s story, and to locate them in time and space? What does this family’s story reveal about life in the second decade of the twenty-first century?

Globalization: The World has Changed

During the second half of the twentieth century—which saw the decolonization of Africa and Asia, and the fall of the USSR—the world moved from a two-centered to a multi-centered politity and economy. The Middle East nationalized its companies and then used its oil as an economic weapon. India insisted on going its own way and China emerged from the “Cultural Revolution” to rapidly become the economic engine of Asia. All this has shifted the center of the world economy, the center of world politics, and the center of attention (especially in the area of electronic communications) away from the United States and the West and toward the East and Global South. Like changes in gravity, all these things bend and shape global concentrations and flows of people (refugees, labor migrants, tourists, international corporations and entrepreneurs), products (everything from money to raw materials to finished electronics), and ideas (everything from capitalism to Christianity to pornography).

The “global flows” of persons, products, and ideas are not simply a continuation of what we have seen in the past, but, as Arjun Appadurai argues, the number, speed, and force of the flows has overwhelmed local and regional systems to the point that new economic regimes, peoples, and histories are being shaped.4 Relevant to our story, the gradual nationalization of the oil companies, along with the successful oil embargo of 1973, made the Arab Gulf States flush with money and anxious for economic growth. Workers were needed to construct infrastructure, buildings for education and military use, and offices, warehouses, and ports for the oil business. At first, the Gulf States tended to import Arab Muslim workers. But then Palestinians took the lead in organizing strikes in the oil fields; Yemenis in Saudi Arabia were implicated in anti-regime activities; and some of those involved in the 1979 attack on Mecca were non-Saudi Arabs.5 Thereafter the Gulf States expelled many Arab workers and turned instead to South Asia, particularly India. By 1990, Saudi Arabia alone had 4.7 million foreign workers. That number grew to 5.1 million by the year 2000. By 2010, 7.3 million foreign workers were in Saudi Arabia, of which 1.3 million were Indian (see table 1, right).

These workers did not get there on their own. Most were recruited by an agency with transnational connections to the labor rich regions of South Asia, Southeast Asia and parts of the Middle East. The working visa required an individual sponsor (for private sector jobs) or a government...
agency (for public sector jobs). The worker’s legal status in the country was directly tied to this sponsor, or kafil. In this system, the state does not have to secure and monitor foreign laborers; the individual employer does that for them. Since the foreign laborer is dependent on his sponsor, the sponsor’s power can lead to abuse. I know one medical doctor who was trapped in service because his sponsor took his passport and would not return it, thus denying him access to communication and travel. After his escape, he made his way to a seminary in the US and has now graduated. The world indeed has changed, and with that change comes opportunity as well as mischief.

**Reasons for Migration**

Most Indians working in the Gulf come from Kerala, a state in India’s southwest region on the Malabar coast. This out-migration (emigration)—known as “the Kerala Gulf Boom”—took place over a ten-year period (1972–1983), when over 2 million Keralites moved to the Gulf for work. Within just a few years (by 1980), these laborers were sending home nearly $7 million in remittances. Since 2007, India has—not surprisingly—been among the world’s top three remittance-receiving countries, with over $25 billion pouring in annually through formal channels.7 Throughout the globalized world as a whole, more than $250 billion is sent home each year in the form of remittances.9

Kerala has a population density of some 820 people per square mile, three times higher than the rest of India. The people are well-educated in Kerala, which enjoys a 94% literacy rate.10 Malayam-speaking people are in the majority, not necessarily an ethnic group), though there are hill tribes and internal migrants who speak other languages. The state is 56% Hindu, 25% Muslim, and 19% Christian. The economy depends mainly on agriculture (especially rubber, spices and rice) and fishing; thus “underemployment” has grown along with the population. Remittances (sent back from both internal and international migrant workers) make up the largest source of income. Given their long history of contact with the rest of the world,11 people from Kerala were ready to move to seize new economic opportunities.

**Migration within Country**

But emigration between nations is not the only kind of population movement that has marked the globalization of the world. In India, internal migration—people moving to other states (e.g., Karnataka and Maharashtra) and especially to other cities (e.g., Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Chennai, and Bangaluru)—is higher than the flow of Indians to other countries.12 Migration and urbanization are intertwined forces that are changing societies.

Since 2000, China has witnessed the massive internal migration of nearly 100 million people. The reform era (gaige kaifang; 1979–present) has reduced the barriers to the movement of labor within China and has created Special Economic Zones (nanxun). Equally significant, in 1988 the practice of assigning jobs to university graduates was eliminated.13 While the Chinese government calls this internal migration “the transfer of surplus rural labor power,”14 it is the most educated and able-bodied who seem to be leaving the land and migrating to the coastal cities. This new reality is also the result of the “mutual choice” (shuangxiang xuanze)15 system that now both permits university graduates to find their own jobs and obligates corporations and urban administrations to find their own employees. The central provinces of Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Henan, and Hubei are rapidly losing population in this rural-to-urban migration.

What do these movements—both internal and external—mean for mission? The question is admittedly complex. Some of these people on the move are Christians

| Table 1. Gulf States (Gulf Cooperation Council countries) with Non-National Population |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Country                        | Total population in millions | Non-nationals in millions | % Non-nationals | Indians in millions | % Indian |
| Saudi Arabia                  | 25.7                          | 7.3                         | 28%                          | 1.3                       | 5%                       |
| Kuwait                        | 2.7                           | 2.1                         | 78%                          | 0.6                       | 22%                      |
| UAE                           | 8.2                           | 7.1                         | 87%                          | 2.2                       | 27%                      |
| Qatar                         | 2.0                           | 1.6                         | 80%                          | 0.5                       | 25%                      |
| Bahrain                       | 1.3                           | 0.7                         | 54%                          | 0.4                       | 31%                      |
| Oman                          | 2.8                           | 0.8                         | 29%                          | —                         | —                         |
| Totals                        | 42.7                          | 19.6                        | 46%                          | 5.0                       | 11.7%                    |
and take their churches with them. Others are not Christians, but have been cut loose from their family, clan, and caste ties that might impede their conversion. Others are at a crisis point in their lives, in special need of a new community and a new worldview. They may be more open to Christ, but they are also vulnerable to competing new ideologies and temptations.

**Migrants Settling in Communities**

The people who are leaving home finally arrive somewhere, whether another country or another region of their own country. The family we have been following ended up in Kuwait. Kuwait gained independence from Britain in the 1960s and, like Saudi Arabia, nationalized its oil industry in the 1970s. Richer per capita than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait needed even more laborers per capita since Kuwaitis themselves did not have to work. Today nearly 80 percent of Kuwait's 3 million people are non-nationals, almost 30 percent of whom are from India.

Susan found Kuwaiti society less restrictive than Saudi society, so she was happy to have her family in Kuwait with more religious freedom. But like the other Gulf States, Kuwait offers no path to citizenship. She and her family will not be allowed to stay in the country indefinitely since, like the majority of foreign workers, she works under a labor contract that someday will not be renewed. Even though they have been in the Gulf for nearly forty years, Thomas and Susan have limited rights and no permanent place in Kuwait society. Still, she wonders what “returning home” will mean given that her three children are now scattered in countries outside India. Just who are these people now?

And how do we account for these new landscapes of migrant laborers, refugees, internal migrants, and “communities” of students, retirees, mail order brides, sex trade slaves, and so on? These “peoples” bend and break our old categories, calling into question the whole process of categorization as well.

Social identity—the question of “peoples”—is an old question. The Old Testament, after the Flood, presents the descendants of Noah's children as being dispersed over the Old world, each with a concluding summary such as this one: “These are the descendants of Ham, by their families, their languages, their lands, and their nations” (Genesis 10:20 NRSV). This gives the impression that family, language, nation, and land overlap to create a “people.” If this is the case (and I doubt that it is), it is only a temporary phase in a larger narrative of continuous change. Genesis chapter 10—which comes after a period of chaos—is followed by yet another period of chaos. And what seemed clear and long-lasting ends up in “confusion” in Chapter 11.

Out of this chaos, God begins to construct a “people.” I say construct because they were not a people, but by God's hand they became a people. God called a Chaldean and sent him into Canaan. His descendants in the fourth generation married Egyptians and Canaanites of various kinds. When God called this “people” out of Egypt, along with them came other people with other origins—people such as the Kenites (Genesis 15:19, Judges 4:11)—to which were added later on such Canaanites as the family of Rahab of Jericho. When they became proud and thought themselves a pure people, God reminded them of their origins.

The word of the LORD came to me: Mortal, make known to Jerusalem her abominations, and say, ‘Thus says the Lord GOD to Jerusalem: Your origin and your birth were in the land of the Canaanites; your father was an Amorite, and your mother a Hittite.’ (Ezekiel 16:1-3; see also Ezekiel 16:45)

A mixed “people” with fuzzy boundaries, indeed.

By New Testament times, Jews lived not only in Jerusalem, but were scattered in the Diaspora across the Roman Empire, and as far away as Persia, India, and Ethiopia, along the trade routes of the time. At Pentecost, there were said to be in Jerusalem people from many lands, but in reality they were Jews from many lands, Jews who were part of the great Jewish Diaspora of the time. As the new “People of the Way” grew, they incorporated half-Jews (that is, Samaritans) and “Wanna-Be Jews” (such as the Ethiopian eunuch). The boundaries of these “groups” were sites of conflict because boundaries were not clear and had to be constantly maintained. And the Roman Empire had just as difficult a time defining who belonged to what group.

But our myth of “peoples”—of tribes, castes, nations, and empires—comes down to us from the Enlightenment through the colonial era. The quest for classification and enumeration has been part of the drive to control populations, and to incorporate them into the colonial project. Appadurai, in his seminal book *Modernity at Large* (1996), has shown that part of the colonial strategy in India was to classify peoples into enduring groups, and then to enumerate people, such as took place during the Great Indian census of 1870. He further argues that this project was undertaken to justify expenditures in Parliament and to bring order and
discipline to colonial rule in India—that is, to guide economic projects as well as judge cases regarding ownership and inheritance of land, criminal activity, and other civil disputes.\(^{21}\)

An early example of this is *The Joint Report of 1847*, subtitled *Measurement and Classification Rules of the Deccan, Gujarát, Konkan and Kamara Surveys*. Appadurai argues that:

> It is, par excellence, a document of bureaucratic rationalization, which seeks to create and standardize revenue rules for all the land under East India Company jurisdiction in the Deccan region, as well as serve larger purposes, such as assessment and dispute settlement. It is a quintessential document of cadastral politics.\(^{22}\)

While the colonial officers admitted that classification was difficult, they still claimed that “[t]hese results are of an absolute and invariable character, capable of being arrived at with equal certainty by many modes.”\(^{23}\) In the minds of the British colonial administration, names and numbers brought order to the exotic—the Oriental “other,” as Edward Said has reminded us\(^{24}\)—through the process of transforming the landscape of difference into recognizable and manageable facts that fit the colonial model. This got played out on a large scale in the great All-India Census project carried out from 1870 through 1931.

Classification and enumeration are never neutral practices. In Scripture, such practices caused trouble for both Moses (Numbers 16-17) and David (I Chronicles 21). There was a time when anthropology thought it possible—and scientific—to separate the world into “cultures” and “languages.” Armed with terms such as “tribe,” “caste,” and “clan,” anthropologists sought to bring conceptual order to the world. But no sooner was one social strand tied up than another one came untangled.

In 1940, the notion of a “tribe” with a “chief” at the head came unraveled with Evans-Pritchard’s study of *The Nuer*,\(^{25}\) which introduced the novel notion of an *acephalous* (headless) society. With Leach’s (1954) study of the Kachins in Burma\(^{26}\) was born the notion of a society that was not stable, but rather oscillated between multiple-models. Barth’s (1959) study of the Pathans in the Swat Valley in Afghanistan\(^{27}\) advanced the concept of a society in motion, constantly being negotiated by patrons and clients. By the 1960s, the idea that a few simple models would serve for categorizing cultures looked rather silly.

Then came the final assault on the concept of “tribe.” Reflecting the frustration of anthropologists who were trying to figure out what was going on in New Guinea, J. A. Barnes wrote the seminal (1962) article, “African Models in the New Guinea Highlands.”\(^{28}\) In it he concluded that the anthropological constructs we thought worked so well in Africa clearly did not work in New Guinea. Simply put, there are no “tribes” (as we understood the term) on that island.\(^{29}\) This, in turn, now raised the possibility that there might be more variation and complexity in Africa than anthropologists had imagined.

Barnes’ article was followed the next year by Marshall Sahlins’ influential “Rich Man, Poor Man, Big Man, Chief.”\(^{30}\) Sahlins’s article demonstrated that, in Melanesia as a whole, few entities that we would call a tribe—or leaders that we might legitimately call a chief—actually exist.

It is this history of the colonial abuse of categories and numbers, as well as the deconstruction of anthropological concepts for describing “peoples,” that led Appadurai to restrict himself to the adjective “cultural” and to avoid the noun “culture.” Appadurai does not want to give the impression that social identity is rooted in primordial sentiments, or that social groups are just family and kinship writ large.\(^{31}\)

What is the take away for the missionary? Well, if you are in the field and confused about just what to call the people in the territory (village, neighborhood, ghetto, *favela*) where you work, you are exactly where you should be. Questions like this cannot be settled by recourse to disputable and corruptible categories. As Brian Howell ably argues:

> by limiting the conversation to “ethnicity,” “ethnic group,” or “people group,” the tendency will be to exclude critical concerns of power, economics, gender, race, cultural change, and inequality that are so often at the heart of the immigration experience.\(^{32}\)

To represent the new realities of globalization, Appadurai offers the term “ethnoscape”—by analogy with the concept of “landscape”—a more neutral approach that forces observers to fill in the particulars with what they actually see at the present time. Here is Appadurai’s description:

> By *ethnoscape* I mean the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree. This is not to say that there are no relatively stable communities and networks of kinship, friendship, work, and leisure, as well as of birth, residence, and other filial forms. But it is to say that the warp of these stabilities is everywhere shot through with the woof of human motion, as more persons and groups deal with the realities of having to move or the fantasies of wanting to move.\(^{33}\)

This means that missionaries are forced to look closely in order to discover exactly
who the people are that they have chosen
to settle among. These people are all
different, all particular to space and time.
Many are ephemeral, on the move, and
will not last long as a discernable group
before they reassemble in another con-
figuration. The missionary’s job is not to
stop the people from moving and chang-
ing, but rather to offer them Christ along
the way. “Planting churches”—if that is
your strategy—means “establishing com-
munities,” not “building buildings.”
The point here is that classification
and enumeration are both constructiv-
ist tasks; classification is not given in
nature. While that has always been
ttrue, it is even more so in today’s glo-
balized and urbanized world. When
anthropologists or missionaries classify
and number people, they do it for a
reason, and those reasons should be
transparent. In the colonial era, the
reason was to rationalize the colonial
project, to justify colonial policies,
and to discipline, regulate, and exploit
colonized people and land. So, it is
worthwhile to ask: Why do anthrop-
ologists (and missionaries) want to
classify and number today?

Diaspora: The First Generation

Thomas and Susan dream of going home.
They are contract workers in Kuwait,
not citizens or even migrants who
could settle there with some sort of
permanent legal standing in the coun-
try. Kuwait has homeland security.
Already, as of this writing in 2013, nearly
4,000 Indians have been deported to
India. So, by desire and by law, a day
will come when they will return home;
but that day is not yet.
The community that Thomas and
Susan belong to in Kuwait can be
called a diaspora community. Dias-
pora is a hot topic, especially now that
missionaries have discovered the term.

Diaspora involves the dispersal of a
people from a homeland to a host
country or countries, the formation of
a community within the host country
that identifies with the homeland, and
the maintenance of links between the
diasporic community and the homel-
land and/or the maintenance of links
among the diasporic communities
themselves. (italics in original)
A good beginning, perhaps, but the
definition does not clarify what the
term “community” means. Thus, the
term diaspora is applied to the people
from one island who settle in Califor-
nia, as well as to larger units who settle
in multiple destinations, such as “the
Chinese Diaspora,” or “the Muslim
Diaspora.” The main attributes are mi-
gration, living together in community,
and links with the homeland and/or
other like diasporic communities.
The first generation often, but not
always, intends to work for a while
and then return home. Thomas and
Susan have been able to send enough
money back to buy a small piece of
land in Kerala and have a retirement
home built for the day when they
leave Kuwait. The return is sometimes
forced, sometimes driven by nostalgia
or economics, when the fortunes of
the host country turn for the worse. Enduring diasporas occur when people
consciously refuse to assimilate (or are
prevented from assimilating) and/or
when continual migration refreshes
the community. The point is that the
diaspora community or the host com-
community—or both—find reasons to
maintain the boundary of difference.

Maintaining the boundary of differ-
ence is not the same as remaining un-
changed, though it is often portrayed
that way. Long ago, Fredrik Barth38
demonstrated that the crucial dynamic
in ethnicity is boundary maintenance
between one group and another. The
defining characteristics of difference
do shift as the perceptions and politics
of either the host or the diasporic
society—or both—change over time.
This can be clearly seen in the differ-
ences between the first and subsequent
generations of a diaspora, or when
newly arrived migrants are compared
with long-term members.

Diaspora and Global Flows

Relationships between diasporas and
their home community differ. While
the stereotype is that diaspora is com-
posed of the poor, studies have shown
otherwise. Those with some education
and means emigrate first, not the poor-
est of the poor who, in any case, are not
able to do so. In the case of the Gulf
States, Indian migrants in the dias-
pora have competed well in the local
economy. A recent report reveals that
ten Indian billionaires and forty Indian
millionaires are now living in the Gulf
States. The fifty richest Indians in the
Gulf are worth $40.2 billion.39

The economic success of overseas
Indians is important for India not
only because of remittances sent back
each paycheck, but also because
the rich in the diaspora are able to
invest back home. That is why the
Indian government, for the second
Several indigenous denominations have for years followed a model of “reverse mission” from Nigeria to the United States.

Diaspora: The Second Generation and Beyond

In our story, the children of the second and subsequent generations in diaspora are not like the first generation. They were born in-country and thus do not have the experience of growing up “at home.” In Kuwait, the curriculum came straight from Delhi, but the classroom included the children of workers from throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Typically, the Indian children were sent back to India for secondary education.

The children did not stay in India, but initially returned to Kuwait. The second child, Anita, was not happy with her parents’ Pentecostal church. In that church, services were conducted in Malayalam. To Anita, this symbolized the limitations of the community: only insiders were welcome. There was no connection to the social setting of Kuwait and all the links were, for second generation Anita, a far away homeland. Anita was not “at home” anywhere—not among Kuwaiti Arabs, nor back in Kerala, nor in her parents’ church.

In Bhabha’s famous phrase, children like Anita are “ unhomed.” Still, there were few choices for Christian fellowship within her tradition since Kuwait recognizes only Roman Catholic, Coptic Orthodox, National Evangelical, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic (Melkite), and Anglican churches.

Eventually, Anita accepted a new job offer and moved to a city in the United Arab Emirates. There she avoided the Malayalee church and instead sought out fellowship in a multicultural church with other expat workers from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Egypt, Australia, the United States, and several African countries. Her worship and sense of mission grew, as well as her personal goals; she is now pursuing an advanced degree in Finance and Banking at an Australian University with a campus in her city.

So, some migrants settle in, but then move again to a secondary diaspora community. This can create a diaspora archipelago, another kind of ethnoscape. The family in our story has ties in Kerala, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Australia, and the United States. Multiple centers are linked—not by geography—but by sentiment, that is, real or imagined “common origin, ethnicity, or religion that does not reduce one to being a subject of a host country.”

Transnationalism

Some people are constantly on the move, becoming part of regular transnational flows of people, products, and ideas. Sandosh remembers that pastors from India are common visitors and guests in the Pentecostal Church in Kuwait. Like the government, they were following the money, seeking support for their churches back home, their ministries, and sometimes their personal needs, such as the cost of marrying off a daughter. The atmosphere in Kuwait is open enough that evangelists from India come and conduct revival meetings each year.

The transnational flow of persons, ideas, money, and products has intensified through the 1990s and 2000s, a situation that has had an important effect on mission. For example, several indigenous denominations have for years followed a model of “reverse mission” from Nigeria to the United States. Nigerian migrants have settled in and around Atlanta, Houston, and the northeastern United States for education and work. Many of these migrants were already members of indigenous Nigerian denominations and so have been cast as “missionaries to America.” They have planted churches in great numbers. Because denominational control remains in Lagos, denominational leaders regularly travel back and forth to provide training and counseling, and pastors in America regularly travel to Lagos for meetings to report on the growth of their churches. This mission model is possible because of the ease of travel across national boundaries. The result is a church whose headquarters is in the Global South and whose mission outreach is in America.

As Appadurai notes:

Globalization has shrunk the distance between elites, shifted key relations between producers and consumers, broken many links between labor and family life, (and) obscured the lines between temporary locales and imaginary national attachments.

Ideas are on the Move: Global Media

Appadurai has offered two more, interrelated metaphors: mediascape and ideoscape. Not surprisingly, the
movement of ideas has been greatly accelerated by developments in media and technology. But whether these developments are actually for the better remains the subject of intense public debate.49

For the second generation in diaspora in Kuwait, media options—such as Facebook, Twitter, and the Internet in general—are readily available. On websites like IndiansinKuwait.com and AbroadIndians.com, one can find a “Kuwait Forum,” which includes discussion threads, advertisements about schools and investment opportunities, as well as classifieds for jobs, automobiles, housing vacancies, etc.

This diaspora community has its own newspapers: The Kuwait Times (an online English-language paper produced by Kuwaitis with expat writers) and an English edition of the Malayala Manorama, the most widely read newspaper in Kerala.50 People have many other media venues where they can share news, opinions, and dreams. Naturally, some posts valorize the Internet. Thus, the Rotuman diaspora archipelago—with a presence in Hawai’i, California, British Columbia, Alberta, England, Sweden, and Norway—only exists as a community in cyberspace.

In contrast to other Pacific Island websites,51 the Rotuman Forum does not include much chatter about problems in adapting to host cultures, discussions about remittances or questions of a genealogical nature. Participants on this site are primarily interested in transportation and communication, a fact that reflects not only the isolation of the home island but also the dispersal of the diaspora.

In a changing world with a widely dispersed diaspora, what does it mean to be Rotuman?254

From another angle, this case also raises the question of how people are organized in our globalizing world. Our Western sociology tells us that the world is made up of “persons,” and that persons gather together in “groups” according to certain affinities: kinship, territoriality, economics, politics, and/or religion. Sometimes these things seem to overlap, and we think that we have a people: a tribe, a kingdom, or a nation. But others would argue that this is a sociology of the past. In the present time—assuming the existence of “persons” for the moment55—people tend to be organized into “networks” held together by the flow of information, money, and goods through various technologies, especially cell phones and various venues on the Internet.56

The argument here is that the “groups” we have grown up with are not the only way to organize the world; indeed, great numbers of people organize their lives in other ways. The power of a social network—with many nodes but no center—can be seen in the difficulty that nations have in dealing with terrorist networks where nodes can operate independent of any central authority. Or that regimes have in dealing with rebellious citizens who, as in the “Arab Spring,” can appear in flash mobs and then disappear before the police can get to them. Or that any nation has in regulating cash flows or commodity flows in international finance. In this light, should mission agencies be organized as a hierarchical group or a decentralized network?

Paul Hopper draws this conclusion:

Hierarchical and bureaucratic institutions such as the nation-state cannot match the organizational efficiency, dynamism and flexibility of networks evident in the difficulties that countries face in dealing with international criminal networks.
Ironically, if governments want to tackle such networks, they will have to function as networks themselves, operating as nodal points, coordinating their activities and pooling their information, all of which entails power being shifted from political institutions to the flows and cultural codes embedded in networks.57

**Identity: Personal and Social**

Indeed, if social identity (that is, the national, ethnic, or religious identity of a group) has become blurred and shifting in our globalized and urbanized world, then personal identity has become more problematic as well. (Or maybe it is only problematic for old missionaries and social scientists—like me—who think that having multiple personalities is a psychiatric disease.)

The youngest brother in our story, Santhosh, is negotiating his identity and his calling. Who is he? It all depends. Here are his words:

I do not hesitate to say that I am Indian—although sometimes I specify, saying, “I carry an Indian passport.” I look “Indian”—I am brown. I am culturally an Indian too—particularly a Malayalee (one from Kerala, who speaks Malayalam). I speak our local language and understand my people. I would self-identify as a Malayalee. But with several qualifications. Foremost of which is that I am a Malayalee who was born and raised in Kuwait. I do not have any affinity toward being Kuwaiti—(my community’s perception of Kuwait is defined as ethnically Arab; religiously, Muslim; economically, well-off). But, I have also spent the last ten years, more than one-third of my life in the United States.

My response to people’s query on where I am from begins with attention to their underlying assumptions. Many in Christian/seminary/mision circles ask these questions with the presumption... that I must return. This expectation is sometimes cloaked in theological (language of) responsibility that is then imposed on the one being questioned. Many times, especially in the early days, I would answer, “My heart is committed to India” (a rather neutral statement about where I might “return” to). Nowadays... I’ll inform them that I was born and raised in Kuwait and that I would be open to going to Dubai/Doha/Kuwait if the Lord opened the door. Then, all of a sudden, they realize that they were too presumptuous. But this answer is still satisfying to them; they are appeased that I will move back to some place where I came from.58

Four reflections about identity are in order. First, as in all presentations of self, much depends on the context, the time, and the “other” to whom one is presenting one’s “self.” While this has always been true, this era of globalization and urbanization vastly expands the range of contexts in which to present oneself. In Kerala, Santhosh does not present himself as Indian, of course, or even a Malayalee, since nearly everyone is and that would not distinguish him. Elsewhere in India, Santhosh might present himself as a Malayalee from Kerala. In Kuwait, and in the presence of Kuwaitis, Santhosh is Indian, but few there would be interested in further details of his identity. At school in the United States, Santhosh does not emphasize being from Kuwait, and certainly does not claim to be Kuwaiti, since he is neither Arab, nor Muslim, nor rich. But, if he presents himself as an Indian, then he has to negotiate his identity with other students who actually grew up in India.

Second, the reader should notice that “caste” is not mentioned even once in the story of this Indian family. While the category “Christian” has come to be treated as a “caste” in some regions, it is still significant that this category, once thought to be pervasive in structuring all Indian societies, is becoming less relevant in the present time, at least among the Indian Diaspora. Indeed, Santhosh had to rethink his Indian identity when he learned from Indian students that caste was still a powerful marker in the church in India.

Third, Santhosh recognizes that all classifications are political. Behind every question and every presentation of self are hidden political assumptions and political statements. In academic settings, I too have noted a hint of xenophobia, even racism, in questions about where a student comes from and how soon they intend to return home. International students in a seminary context are hemmed in by assumptions that evangelism and church planting back in their home country are the only appropriate callings for them. When teachers, advisors, and sponsors make these assumptions, power is added to the complex mix of the presentation of self in everyday society.

Fourth, given different contexts, different generations, and power differentials, there is an endless variety of contested personal and social identities that might be owned or applied. Shifting now to a different setting for a moment, Juliet Uytanlet, a doctoral student, reports on the variety of names applied to the Chinese Diaspora in the Philippines over time.

The Spaniards called them Sangleyes then Chinos. The Americans called them Chinamen, Coolies and Aliens. The Filipinos called them Tsino, Kabise, Tsekwa, Instik, Beho, Barok, Buchiki, Bulol, Singkit, Singkot, Tsinto or Tsinita, Chinky-eyed, Chinks, Tsnoy, or Chinoy. The social scientists categorized them as Huasang “merchants,” Huaquiao “sojourners,” and Huaren “Chinese people in diaspora.” They were also labeled as overseas Chinese, Jews of the East, immigrants, transnationals,
market-dominant minorities, flexible identities, cosmopolitans, cosmopolitan capitalists, or global cosmopolitans. In academics, proper reference to the Chinese in the Philippines has evolved as well from mere Chinese to Philippine Chinese to Filipino-Chinese to Chinese-Filipino to Chinese Filipino without the hyphen. The Chinese Filipinos today tend to call themselves lanlang, Tiong Kok lang, Banlam lang, or Tsinoy. There are still some who call themselves Huana.59

If Chinese in the Philippines—whose families may have been there for two hundred years or just arrived—can sit around the tea shop and argue about identity; and if Chinese intellectuals in the Philippines can write books about ethnic identity; how do anthropologists and missionaries have the hubris to pretend that they can assign identity to the Chinese there?

If things are that complex, variable, and open to contestation in the Chinese Diaspora, things are no less clear-cut back in China. Throughout a turbulent century the meaning of “self” and the identity markers for “self” have changed significantly several times in China. From the imperial period at the beginning of the 1900s, through the Republic, the Civil War, and the various stages of the Communist era (including the emphasis on collectives), the Cultural Revolution, and then the Reform Era, personal identity and the relationship between self and society has undergone dramatic changes.

Some argue that, in the present time, the spread of capitalism and its careful adoption by the Chinese government will lead to the construction of a “person” similar to the individual that we imagine in Western societies. Lisa Hoffman considers this conjecture, then discards it. The rise of competitive capitalism in cities along the coast, the demise of rules regulating the movement of labor, and the shift to an open job market have led to changes in the perception and presentation of self. The result, however, is not what outsiders expected.

Although I argue that neoliberal techniques of governing, such as more autonomous decision making and the marketization of labor, have been adopted in China, I also argue that these neoliberal techniques of governing are being combined with non-liberal ways of governing the self and others—such as Maoist-era politics of social modernization and ethics of concern for the well-being of the nation. It thus does not make sense to describe the new urban professionals as “neoliberal subjects,” for that assumes too much about the ethics and politics of these young people. My analysis challenges more traditional understandings of neoliberalism as a particular combination of political, technical, and ideological elements that necessarily emerges as a “package” in disparate locations. I thus aim to contribute to understandings of changing urban life in China, anthropological studies of subject-formation in global city spaces, and analyses of neoliberalism itself.60

Young Chinese do make their own decisions about jobs, housing, and marriage. But Hoffman argues that they do so with more than their own “good” in mind. They also consider the good of the family, the community, and the nation; thus emerges a different kind of “self” than one finds in the West: a “patriotic professional.”

From another angle, Yan Hairong follows the changing categories of domestic servants in China from the Qing dynasty through the ups and downs of the Communist era. The concept of a niangyi “domestic servant” in Qing society fell out of favor during the People’s Republic, though high party officials did have baomu “protecting mother” or ayi “aunties.” Having any “servants” at all was frowned upon during the Cultural Revolution, but during the 1980s, the concept of jiating fuwuyan “domestic-service personnel” emerged. In the present time, baomu has returned, though currently the preferred term is dagongmei, “young woman selling labor,” a reference today to young, single rural women who work in the city.61

Tellingly, Hairong found these workers constantly agonizing about their identity or status (shenfen) in society.62 Social identity and personal identity, the sense of self, are not a given in any society, and make up a contested area in most. Missionaries must discover who they are talking to.

Final Thoughts
Migration, urbanization, diaspora, and identity are merely some of the forces flowing, swirling, and creating turbulence in the globalization project in which humanity is currently engaged. The effects are uneven. Cities like Bangalore and Dalian (“China’s Bangalore”63) are nodes in the networks of information technology companies, labor migration, and factory production, while the rural states of India and provinces of China are losing their most mobile and educated cohorts, to the point that land itself is sometimes abandoned.64 The world is definitely not flat.

But the world is lost. If people are on the move, then missionaries should be on the move. If people are adept at negotiating identities in emerging contexts, then missionaries should be also.65 If people are suffering from global flows that leave them economically destitute and bereft of hope, then missionaries should enter into the situation, empathize with the pain, and
discover what a Christ-centered community looks like in that world. There are missionaries doing just that. They are missionaries from the Global South who are already right in the middle of this mix: Indian Christians who have migrated to the Gulf; rural Chinese Christians who have migrated to coastal cities; Nigerian Pentecostals who have migrated to Atlanta for work and have founded churches; and Singaporean Christians who are living and working in Vietnam. In this emerging stream of mission, what might the place of Western missionaries be? Stop, look, and listen, at least for the moment.

Unfortunately, the response is often to try to find a way to take control of this movement of the Spirit by naming, numbering, and training. Training too often means teaching migrant missionaries a particular Western model of mission. The emerging churches, the migrant, urban, diasporic churches, have their own ecclesiology and homiletics, as well as missiology. If we take only an instrumental or “strategic” view of them, we may miss the work of God in the present time.

Endnotes
1 My thanks to Eunice Irwin, Stanley John, and Steve Ybarrola for critiquing previous drafts.
2 I use “persons” here to draw attention to identity issues that become even more critical when people are moving and settling in a new land or city.
3 This is a true story. The names and some details have been changed to guard their privacy.
5 Specifically, “the Gulf Cooperation Council” made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
7 King et al., pp. 98-99. The other two countries receiving more than $25 billion in remittances from their overseas workers are Mexico and China. Remittances are also sent through informal channels, but these cannot be counted.
9 King et al., pp. 98-99.
10 Thus, Kerala is the only state in India ranked “very high” on the Human Development Index (2013).
11 This is the west coast of India, a spice-producing area that was engaged in trade with the Roman Empire, and successive economic systems in Europe and the Middle East for the last 3000 years. This is where St. Thomas is reported to have planted churches and been martyred.
12 King et al., pp. 54-55.
15 Hairong, p. 62.
16 By some reports, 218 million people are living in a country other than where they were born, by others, 232 million. This is only 3% of the world population. However, when one includes undocumented immigrants, internal migrants, and the second generation in diaspora, the number could swell to half a billion. Consider all of those impacted by loss of emigrants, and by the receiving of remittances, and the impact of migration grows to one billion people.
17 This may be slowly changing as the mandatory age of retirement has recently been moved from 60 to 65 and there are provisions for requesting an extension.
18 Not to mention Tamar, Ruth, and Bathsheba—all Canaanites in the genealogy of Jesus.
19 Remember that, at the same time, local people were active in resisting and subverting the colonial project.
20 Appadurai says: “I have been inspired by two essays: one by Benedict Anderson (1991) and one by Sudipta Kaviraj (1994), which together suggest an important new agenda for a critique of European colonial rule. Taking the Indian colonial experience as my case, I shall try to elaborate the idea that we have paid a good deal of attention to the classificatory logic of colonial regimes, but less attention to the ways in which they employ quantification in censuses as well as in various other instruments like maps, agrarian surveys, racial studies, and in a variety of other productions of the colonial archive.” Appadurai p. 115.
21 “The role of numbers in complex information-gathering apparatuses such as the colonial one in India had two sides that in retrospect need to be distinguished. The one side may be described as justificatory and the other as disciplinary.” Appadurai p. 115.
22 Appadurai, p. 121.
23 Appadurai, p. 122.
29 To be sure, local people recognize groups and alliances, but they do not use the same criteria that we do to divide up the social world. In fact, Marilyn Strathern has opted for the concept “sociality” rather than “society” in order to begin fresh describing how New Guinea people negotiate relationship and groups. (1988) The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
31 Appadurai, pp. 13-14.
Mission in “the Present Time”: What about the People in Diaspora?

They do meet, not in their own building but in the National Evangelical Church compound.


They have dispersed people who have no desire or intention to return home, some who have no home to return to (e.g., the Bikini Marshallese whose home atoll is radioactive and is missing some islets altogether), and some that go so far as to demonize “home” as a bad place to which no one would want to return.

For example, when I was in Lithuania in 2008, many people talked about relatives who had migrated to Ireland because the economy was booming there. By 2010 that was not the case and some workers were returning home or moving on to whatever the boom was.


As Steve Ybarrola has pointed out, the interest of the first generation in working for their children and adapting when they need to, is not the interest of the second generation that often rejects the culture of origin in favor of fitting into the new culture, and this is not the interest of the third generation that often goes back to rediscover what was lost of the culture of origin. “Diasporas and Multiculturalism: Social Ideologies, Liminality, and Cultural Identity,” in Sadiri Joy Tira, editor, The Human Tidal Wave: Global Migration, Megacities, Multiculturalism, Diaspora Missiology. Manilla: LifeChange Publishing, 2013.

See helpful video about “not being at home.” http://www.ted.com/talks/pico_iyer_where_is_home.html


Hopper, p. 80.

Santhosh (a pseudonym).


Hoffman, p. 7.

Hairong, pp. 6, 17-21.

Haimon, p. 7.

Haimon, p. 5.

Hairong, p. 43.

As Brian Howell points out, this takes us way beyond “contextualization” of the Gospel to a particular culture, since a migrant community is not the same as a village back home, and most likely is composed of people from different languages anyway, as one would find in a “Hispanic” neighborhood in a city in the United States, p. 80.


Miriam Adenev argues that the “uncoordinated movement (ethnic mission outreach) is of interest because it may have the potential to revitalize North American mission at large.” “Colorful Initiatives: North American Diaspora in Mission,” in Missiology (2011) 39:1:5-23. p. 7.

Adenev goes so far as to claim that “monocultural Christians from cocooned enclaves do not have the experience to lead.” p. 7. This is just another way that the U.S. is a mission field.


Howell argues that “the goal of the missionary should always be to empower the local church to engage in mission, rather than train specialists or professionals for the task.” p. 83.